Between geopolitical calculations, Russian economic resilience, and diverging interests, the conflict is bogged down in a war of attrition that neither side seems willing to end.
By Robert Harneis
The war in Ukraine is entering its fifth year with no negotiated way out in sight for either belligerent. Behind the mud of the trenches and the victory communiqués, a complex machinery — military, economic, diplomatic — has taken hold, keeping the conflict in a precarious equilibrium, so far. An in-depth look.
A long war no one wanted, pursued by everyone
Neither Moscow nor Kyiv anticipated such a prolonged conflict. In 2022, Russia hoped for a lightning victory through decisive strikes on Kyiv, Kharkov, and the corridor leading to Crimea. The West, for its part, was betting on a rapid collapse of the Russian economy under the weight of unprecedented sanctions — the freezing of $300 billion in reserves, exclusion from the SWIFT system, diplomatic isolation. Both sides were disappointed, although Russia did achieve the land corridor to Crimea and the capture of Europe’s biggest nuclear power plant.
Today, the conflict follows a logic of attrition much encouraged by the drone revolution. Russia is waging a slow war, aware that it faces a Ukraine backed by the financial and military arsenal of the United States, NATO, and most Western countries. The model is simple: Ukraine provides the men; the West provides the weapons. Unfortunately Ukraine is running out of men and the West is running out of weapons. Unlike the state owned Russian armaments industry, the Western military industrial complex is focused on profit not mass industrial warfare. The line of conflict in Ukraine is twice the length of the Western Front in the First World War, a situation totally outside modern Western military experience.
Russia: a more resilient economy than expected
One of the great surprises of this conflict has been the resilience of the Russian economy. The West had severely underestimated its degree of self-sufficiency. As a producer of its own energy and food resources, with an industrial base inherited from the Soviet era and relatively insulated from financialization, Russia has managed to adapt.
According to the IMF, measured in purchasing power parity (PPP), the country is now ranked the world’s fourth-largest economy, behind China, the United States, and India. Paradoxically, the sanctions stimulated local production through import substitution and encouraged the repatriation of capital. Russia’s military-industrial complex has demonstrated its capacity to sustain a prolonged war effort, notably through the reactivation of Soviet-era stockpiles and the use of low-cost guided munitions. Western media have regularly predicted Russia suffering economic collapse and running out of weapons.
There are no signs of either happening
By contrast the European Union, especially Germany has suffered severe economic damage, through the loss of a reliable supply of cheap Russian energy. This undoubtedly suits Russia but also the United States. The Eurozone has lost credibility as a result of freezing Russian government funds. Central banks across the world calculate, if they can do it to Russia, they can certainly do it to us.
Some commentators believe Washington deliberately pushed Europe to adopt these extreme sanctions with a view to weakening it as an economic rival. True or not, it is what has happened.
Ukraine: between survival and dependency
On the Ukrainian side, internal factors are complicating any prospect of negotiation. The Kyiv government benefits, both legally and illegally, from massive financial flows tied to the war effort. The radical nationalist units that form part of the military apparatus have publicly threatened to turn on Zelensky should he sign a peace deal with Moscow — thereby forcing him to betray his 2019 electoral promise that brought him to power. The Ukrainian people have never voted for a policy of hostility to Russia but it is what they are forced to endure. The idea that Ukrainians are dying heroically to defend democracy is laughable. The extreme nationalist minority is fighting with courage, skill and determination, the rest of the population is being forced to enlist and fight.
The war has many of the characteristics of a civil war. The Ukrainian commander in chief has a brother who is a colonel in the Russian army. Many Russians have relatives living in Ukraine.
A conflict with global geopolitical dimensions
For Moscow, as Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated, the Ukrainian war is not an isolated territorial conflict but a symptom of a broader struggle: the one waged by Washington to preserve its hegemony in the face of China’s rise and Russia’s renewed military power. In this context, Beijing is quietly backing Moscow — Sino-Russian trade has grown significantly — while Russia simultaneously maintains good relations with New Delhi to avoid exclusive dependence on a single partner.
The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO represents a strategic setback for Moscow, however, adding some 1,340 kilometers of shared border with the Atlantic Alliance. By contrast, the development of BRICS offers Russia channels to circumvent sanctions, reducing its dependence on the dollar in international trade.
War objectives in flux
On the Russian side, war aims have gradually shifted. From a simple stabilization of the status quo in 2022, Moscow moved to formally annexing four Ukrainian regions, while some internal voices are now calling for even broader territorial conquests. Should the conflict continue without a negotiated solution, Ukraine could lose much more territory. Public opinion in Russia is strongly in favor of occupying Odessa and the Black Sea coast.
There has never been any doubt that the United States and its European allies are backing the war as a way to weaken Russia regardless of the fate of the people of Ukraine. It is more than a remote possibility that the United States would be happy to see Moscow maneuvered into occupying the whole country, resulting in years of economic strain and troublesome political complications. For the EU this would have the advantage of encouraging electoral support for re-armament but it would lead to serious political risks with governments like Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic no longer landlocked and benefiting from a border with Russia. This would give them new geopolitical choices in the face of a European Union determined on using the war to centralize control over member states.
BY THE NUMBERS
• 1.5 million lives lost according to various estimates since the conflict began in 2022
• 4th largest economy in the world — Russia’s ranking according to the IMF in purchasing power parity.